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Murder, Fraud, and Tortious
Interference: The Interplay Between
Probate Court Jurisdiction and
Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode
Island
Rebecca M. Murphy
INTRODUCTION

Your only living son, aged thirty, dies suddenly from
what is determined by the Medical Examiner to be a
heroin overdose. You are blindsided, as you never knew
your son to dabble in drugs. You muddle through funeral
arrangements and grieve with your family and friends.
After a couple of weeks, you consult your attorney to
begin the process of probating your son’s assets, as you
believe that he has died intestate. A few days after you
file a Petition for Administration in the probate court, to
your great surprise, a woman whom you have never met
claims to be your son’s live-in fiancée and files a
document with the probate court purporting to be your
son’s “Last Will and Testament.”
This one-paged
document leaves all of your son’s assets to the “fiancée.”
It is dated a mere five days before your son’s date of
death, and you believe that your son’s signature is forged.
After a bit of digging, you determine that the two
witnesses to the “Will” are the “fiancée’s” cousin and
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former boyfriend. What is more, your son has recently
inherited extremely valuable United States savings bonds
from his aunt. Your inheritance is in jeopardy.
What is Mom’s legal recourse? Is she constrained to pursue her
will challenge and claims against the fiancée in probate court?
Likely, many estate law practitioners will instinctively reply “yes”
to the foregoing question. Realistically, however, the answer is
more nuanced.
The Rhode Island Superior Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
probate court matters pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws section 8-2-17 is
clear and universally acknowledged by Rhode Island courts and
estate law practitioners alike.1 But what about the equitable
provision of section 8-2-17, which states that the superior court
has general probate jurisdiction “when such jurisdiction is
properly involved in suits in equity”?2 And what about actions
against in personam defendants that seek damages distinct from
the property being supervised or managed by the probate court?
Can Mom, in the above hypothetical, “pass go” and directly pursue
claims against the fiancée in superior court? Or must she litigate
in probate court and await an appeal of the probate court’s order
before she has access to superior court? And, by the way, why
would she want to bypass probate court at all?
Part I of this Article discusses the material differences
between litigating claims in probate versus superior court, as well
as the advantages of filing suit in the first instance in superior
court. Part II provides background regarding probate court
jurisdiction. Part III addresses the interplay between Rhode
Island Probate and Superior Court jurisdiction, including (a)
statutory causes of action relating to or affecting will contests,
which indisputably can be brought in the first instance in superior
court; (b) the superior court’s exercise of equity jurisdiction; and
(c) the superior court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Last,
Part IV applies our jurisdictional analysis to Mom’s potential
claims.

1. See, e.g., Duff v. Leighton, 97 A.2d 110 (R.I. 1953); In re Raposa’s
Estate, 82 A.2d 836 (R.I. 1951).
2. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-17 (2012).
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I.

LITIGATING IN PROBATE COURT VERSUS SUPERIOR COURT

For cases involving complicated facts or complex issues of law,
litigating in probate courts may prove to be inefficient. There are
thirty-nine probate courts in Rhode Island—one for each
municipality.3 Many of these courts meet only once per month,
while others meet twice.4 Probate judges sit part-time and often
maintain other law practices. The net result is that motion
practice in the probate court can tend to be more drawn out than
it is in superior court.
The Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure are generally selfexecuting in superior court, meaning that the parties may avail
themselves of discovery devices without court assistance or
intervention.5 On the other hand, in the probate courts parties
must petition, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws sections 8-9-17 and 918-12, for the use of discovery devices to obtain information from
the opposing party.6 A probate court may then exercise its
discretion and “limit the scope of discovery to what is relevant to
the contested issue before it and may shorten or enlarge deadlines
for compliance as circumstances warrant.”7 While parties may
generally appeal probate court decisions and orders, discovery
orders, which lack the requisite finality, are not appealable.8
Consequently, if a party requires additional discovery than was
granted, she must await a final determination by the probate
court and then, if she is aggrieved, appeal to the superior court
where she may obtain additional discovery.9
With respect to hearings, probate courts may choose whether
to apply the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
parties can decide jointly whether to apply the Rhode Island Rules
of Evidence, with the result that hearings may take on a flexible,
informal tone.10 Decisions are always rendered by a probate court
3. See Probate Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.
ncsc.org/Topics/Special-Jurisdiction/Probate-Courts/State-Links.aspx#Rhode
Island (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
4. See Rhode Island Probate Courts, PROVIDENCERI.COM, http://
www.providenceri.com/efile/620 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
5. See generally R.I. R. CIV. P. 26 (outlining discovery practice).
6. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-9-17, 9-18-12 (2012).
7. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-22-19.2(c) (2011).
8. See Burford v. Estate of Skelly, 699 A.2d 854, 856 (R.I. 1997).
9. See id.
10. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-22-19.2.
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judge, never a jury.11 And parties advancing in age do not have
the benefit of Rhode Island General Laws section 9-2-18, which
provides for acceleration of civil actions in cases where a “plaintiff
or defendant has attained the age of sixty-five (65) years.”12
Any person aggrieved by a final decision of a probate court
may, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws section 33-23-1, file an appeal to
the superior court which reviews, de novo, the decision of the
probate court.13 Indeed, “[t]he findings of fact and/or decisions of
the probate court may be given as much weight and deference as
the superior court deems appropriate, however, the superior court
shall not be bound by any such findings or decisions.”14 Litigators
are often mindful of the length of time it will take to obtain a final
disposition of their clients’ claims. Adding a probate court
proceeding to the mix when the action may ultimately bounce
from the superior court to the supreme (and back again) serves to
prolong the case, much to the frustration of the claimants. It goes
without saying that in cases where time is of the essence it is
beneficial for a claimant to immediately avail herself of the
jurisdiction of the superior court.
II. A BIT OF BACKGROUND: THE PROBATE EXCEPTION

Rhode Island probate courts derive their jurisdiction from
Rhode Island General Laws section 8-9-9, which states in
pertinent part:
Every probate court shall have jurisdiction in the town or
city in which it is established of the probate of wills; the
granting of administration, the appointment of
custodians, of administrators, of guardians of persons and
estates, or of persons only or of estates only, and of
conservators; the accepting and allowing of bonds,
inventories, and accounts of executors, administrators,
and guardians; the granting of leave to sell at public or

11. See ALICE BRIDGET GIBNEY, KNOW YOUR COURTS: RHODE ISLAND
SUPERIOR COURT (2012), available at http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/
SuperiorCourt/PDF/SuperiorKnowYourCourts.pdf.
12. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-2-18 (2012).
13. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-23-1 (Supp. 2014).
14. Id.
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private sale, or to mortgage property, as hereinafter
provided; of the making of partition of the real estate of
deceased persons; of the adoption of persons eighteen (18)
years of age or older; of change of names of persons; of the
removal or filling of a vacancy of a trustee of any trust
established under a will, or the termination of such trust;
of setting off and allowing real estate and personal
property to widows and surviving husbands; and of all
other matters now within the jurisdiction of probate
courts.
The court shall have power to accept the
resignation of, or to remove, any custodian, executor,
administrator, or guardian, or any other person
appointed by the court, and also power to do and transact
all matters and things incidental to the jurisdiction and
powers vested in probate courts by law. Every probate
court shall have the power to follow the course of equity
insofar as necessary to fulfill the mandates of title 33 of
the General Laws, specifically: the replacement, removal,
or filling of any vacancy of any trustee under a trust
established under a will; or tax minimization or estate
planning under § 33-15-37.1.15
Rhode Island courts have held that probate courts are special
courts of limited jurisdiction and can “‘exercis[e] . . . jurisdiction
only in a manner and to the extent conferred by statute.’”16
Indeed, section 8-9-9 indicates that the jurisdiction of the probate
courts “is oriented [only] toward the supervision and management
of a probate estate and the expeditious settling of the estate.”17
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, both the Rhode Island
Superior Court and the Rhode Island Federal District Court are
cautious about “entertaining disputes over property still subject to
the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.”18 Indeed, these Rhode
15. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-9-9 (2012).
16. Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291, 293 (R.I. 1999) (quoting Harrop v.
Tillinghast, 195 A. 226, 228 (R.I. 1937)); accord Thompson v. Clarke, 127 A.
569, 570 (R.I. 1925).
17. DAVID T. RIEDEL, WILLS, TRUSTS AND GIFTS § 544 (Butterworth Legal
Publishers 1991).
18. Estate of Donatelli v. Berkshire Place, Ltd., No. PC-2011-3423, 2014
WL 185329, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2014) (“The probate court has
exclusive original jurisdiction in matters relating to the probating of wills.”
(quoting Dugdale v. Chase, 157 A. 430, 431 (R.I. 1931)) (internal quotation
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Island courts are loath to adjudicate cases “even tangentially
concerning the administration of a probate estate.”19
The circumspect approach taken by these Rhode Island courts
in examining claims relating to the handling of wills and/or
estates may be an outgrowth of the oft-cited “probate exception” of
the federal common law.20 The probate exception was devised to
“promote legal certainty and judicial economy by providing a
single forum of litigation, and to tap the expertise of probate
judges by conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the probate court.”21
The United States Supreme Court has defined the root of the
exception to mean that “a federal court has no jurisdiction to
probate a will or administer an estate,” hence the “exception” to
federal court jurisdiction.22
Unfortunately, the doctrine has been met with various
interpretations and, at times, contrasting applications.
Specifically, while some courts have opted for a broader
interpretation of the doctrine, holding that it precludes nonprobate courts from adjudicating even ancillary probate matters,
others have limited the doctrine strictly to the administration of
wills and management of estates.23 Judge Richard A. Posner once
described the probate exception as “one of the most mysterious
and esoteric branches of the law of federal jurisdiction.”24 After
centuries of uncertainty, the United States Supreme Court in
marks omitted) (citing Donato v. BankBoston, N.A., 110 F. Supp. 2d. 42, 45
(D.R.I. 2000))).
19. Burt v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank, No. C.A. PC/02-2243, 2006 WL
2089254, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 2006).
20. The probate exception likely originated in 1789 with the passage of
the Judiciary Act, which conferred on federal courts, in diversity cases,
concurrent jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
21. Burt, 2006 WL 2089254, at *6 (quoting Lepard v. NBD Bank, 384
F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946).
23. Compare Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that claims of undue influence exerted upon decedents which
affected the ultimate disposition of a probate estate were deemed
“enforceable in a state court of general jurisdiction”), with Mangieri v.
Mangieri, 226 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming a district court’s decision to
dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the executor for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the claim “would improperly interfere
with a probate proceeding”).
24. Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
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Marshall v. Marshall attempted to define the contours of the
probate exception and, in doing so, endorsed a narrower
application of the doctrine.25
In Marshall, a widow, who was apparently disinherited by the
decedent, filed an action against the decedent’s son, alleging that
he tortiously interfered with a gift she expected from the
decedent.26
In determining whether the district court had
jurisdiction to hear the widow’s claim, the Court noted that many
federal courts had abstained from adjudicating matters that
extend “well beyond probate of a will or administration of a
decedent’s estate,” including an executor’s breach of fiduciary
duty.27 The Court read Markham v. Allen to mean only that
“when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a
second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same
res.”28 Thus, the Court continued, while the probate exception
prevents federal courts from disposing of property in the custody
of a state probate court, “it does not bar federal courts from
adjudicating matters outside those confines and otherwise within
federal jurisdiction.”29
The move away from a more expansive application of the
probate exception doctrine, as espoused in Marshall, has echoed
softly through the Rhode Island court system in the time since.
For instance, while recognizing that the probate exception is a
federal doctrine affecting federal courts, the Rhode Island
Superior Court in Burt v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust drew a
comparison to Rhode Island General Laws section 8-9-9,
prescribing the jurisdictional scope of Rhode Island probate
courts.30 In Burt, the plaintiffs filed suit against the co-executors
of the decedent’s estate in superior court while estate proceedings
in probate court were ongoing.31 The plaintiffs alleged that the coexecutors breached their fiduciary duties by: (1) failing to obtain
an independent appraisal of the company in which the estate was
the largest shareholder, instead allowing the estate’s shares to be
25. 547 U.S. 293, 304 (2006).
26. Id. at 300–01.
27. Id. at 311.
28. Id. (citing Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 492, 496 (1946)).
29. Id. at 311–12.
30. No. C.A. PC/02-2243, 2006 WL 2089254, at *6, 9 (R.I. Super. Ct. July
26, 2006).
31. Id. at *3.
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sold at a price far below their value; and (2) failing to bring an
action against the other shareholders or to take any action to seek
relief for the substantial dilution in the value of the stock.32
The Burt court found that the plaintiffs’ claim “d[id] not
involve the administration of an estate, the probate of a will, or
any other purely probate matter.”33 Significantly, the court found
that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is a “well-established
cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island
Superior Court” and was properly brought.34 Also significant for
the court was the fact that the plaintiffs were seeking an “in
personam” judgment against the executors, such that the damages
sought were distinct from the res being administered by the
probate court.35
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island next considered the probate exception in the wake of the
Marshall decision. In Henry v. Sheffield, the plaintiffs asserted
claims against the executors/beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate
for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty in administering the estate,
tortious interference with an inheritance, and fraud.36 The court
found that the claims asserted by the plaintiffs sought “in
personam judgments against individual Defendants, and not the
probate or annulment of a will.”37 Nor did the claims “involve the
administration of an estate, the probate of a will, or any other
purely probate matter” or “seek to reach a res in the custody of a
state court.”38 Accordingly, the probate exception did not apply,
and the court was free to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claims.
And in Estate of Donatelli v. Berkshire Place Associates, the
Rhode Island Superior Court once again considered the United
32. Id.
33. Id. at *7 (emphasis added) (quoting Marshall, 547 U.S. at 304)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. Interestingly, for Mom’s purposes, there was a footnote in the
court’s decision that analogized the plaintiffs’ claims to the claim of fraud
brought in Champlin v. Slocum, 103 A. 706 (R.I. 1918), which the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held would not be appropriate for resolution by the
probate court. Burt, 2006 WL 2089254, at *7 n.9. The Champlin case is
discussed in more detail infra.
35. Burt, 2006 WL 2089254, at *6.
36. 856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 349 (D.R.I. 2012).
37. Id. at 351.
38. Id. (quoting Marshall, 547 U.S. at 312) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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States Supreme Court’s decision on the probate exception.39
There, the decedent had ownership interests in two closely related
businesses.40 The estate filed suit in superior court, seeking
access to various books and records held by the businesses.41 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the
estate violated the by-laws and partnership agreement by failing
to offer to sell its interests back to the businesses or their
shareholders.42 The court reiterated the old principle that it must
“tread cautiously when entertaining disputes over property still
subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.”43 Nonetheless, it
cited to Marshall and denied the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, reaffirming that “cases with factual circumstances that
are more tenuously connected with the direct probate of a will or
administration of an estate . . . will not be barred by the probate
exception.”44
The takeaway is that, in the wake of Marshall, the Rhode
Island Superior and Federal District courts will identify whether a
lawsuit concerns a purely probate matter or a matter that is more
tenuously related to probating a will or administering an estate
when examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is proper.
III. SUPERIOR COURT VERSUS PROBATE COURT JURISDICTION

In contrast with probate courts, the Rhode Island Superior
Court is a court of general jurisdiction.45 However, while this
jurisdiction is considerable, it is not plenary. The Rhode Island
Superior Court will exercise the utmost care to avoid adjudicating
claims that directly implicate property subject to the jurisdiction
of the probate courts. The inquiry is two-fold. The court must
first determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction affects,

39. No. PC-2011-3423, 2014 WL 185329, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 7,
2014).
40. Id. at *1.
41. Id. at *2.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Dugdale v. Chase, 157 A. 430, 431 (1931); Donato v.
BankBoston, N.A., 110 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D.R.I. 2000)).
44. Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting Burt v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank,
No. C.A. PC/02-2243, 2006 WL 2089254, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See Carr v. Railton, 18 A.2d 646, 651 (R.I. 1941).
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concerns, or interferes with a probate res or proceeding.46 If not,
the court may entertain the action.47 If so, the court must then
determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
statute.48
A. In Personam Actions
To the extent a plaintiff brings a claim in superior court that
does not affect property in the custody of the probate court and
instead seeks an in personam judgment against an individual
defendant, the court will likely find that jurisdiction is proper.49
In Three Keys Ltd. v. SR Util. Holding Co., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit clarified the distinction
between an in personam action and one in rem, the adjudication of
which would run afoul of the probate exception:
[W]e note the distinction between an in personam action
seeking a judgment that a party has the right to a
distributive share of an estate, but stopping short of
determining a party’s interest in specific estate property,
and an in rem action . . . which seeks a determination of a
party’s interest in specific property in the custody of the
probate court. The distinction mirrors the traditional
understanding of a judgment in personam, which is “of
such character that by means of it the plaintiff can, as a
means of attaining the principal object of the action,
subject the general assets of defendant, as distinguished
from some specific property interest, to the payment of his
claim.”50
46. See Burt, 2006 WL 2089254, at *7.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., id.
50. 540 F.3d 220, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Walter
W. Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 38 (1915)).
See also Henry v. Sheffield, 749 F. Supp. 2d 3, 9 n.4 (D.R.I. 2010) (“[W]here
there is an interface of in rem and in personam jurisdiction, a court may
properly exercise broad in personam power over the parties to the in rem
action.” (quoting United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, Serial No. 35A-280,
Registration No. YN-BVO, 836 F.2d 1571, 1576 (11th Cir. 1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Bouchard v. Bouchard, 382 A.2d 810, 814 (R.I.
1978) (explaining that in rem jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the thing, while
in personam jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the person).
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The distinction turns on whether the party is asking the court to
determine his or her interest in specific estate property. If so, the
action is in rem. And while the superior court may award money
damages against in personam defendants for tortious actions, the
probate exception prohibits it from imposing a constructive trust
over estate assets or using the assets to compensate plaintiffs for
their damages.51
What kinds of actions qualify as in personam actions that
may be filed in the first instance in superior court? Henry and
Burt establish that, generally, claims alleging tortious
interference with an inheritance and claims for breaches of
fiduciary duty seek in personam judgments without interfering
with a probate court res.52 How about claims of undue influence?
This could be a closer call. Courts outside Rhode Island do classify
undue influence claims as in personam.53 However, often claims
that a testator was unduly influenced invalidate a will being
probated by a probate court and affect the ultimate disposition of
the decedent’s assets that remain within the jurisdiction of the
probate court.54 In the case of charitable bequests, where a gift is
51. See, e.g., Three Keys, 540 F.3d at 229 n.10 (“[W]hile claims that seek
to invoke a federal court’s in personam jurisdiction generally do not violate
the probate exception, that does not permit a court to grant as relief the
possession of specific property that is within the jurisdiction of a probate
court.”); Wisecarver v. Moore, 489 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir. 2007) (barring the
court from granting relief in the form of an order divesting the primary
beneficiaries of an estate of all property retained by them even though the
claims were in personam); Rothberg v. Marger, No. 11-5497, 2013 WL
1314699, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2013).
52. Henry v. Sheffield, 856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 351 (D.R.I. 2012); Burt, 2006
WL 2089254, at *7 (“[T]he damages remedy sought is entirely distinct from
the probate res, and the plaintiffs’ suit is, therefore, cognizable in the
Superior Court.”).
53. See, e.g., Wisecarver, 489 F.3d at 747 (holding that claims for breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of confidential relationship, undue influence, and
fraud that alleged that individuals wrongfully received assets from decedent
during his lifetime by misusing power of attorney did not fall within probate
exception as they sought in personam jurisdiction over individuals and did
not seek to probate or annul decedent’s will or interfere with res in state
probate proceedings); Johnson v. Tomlinson, 160 N.W.2d 49, 54 (N.D. 1968)
(“We find that the sole purpose and object of the action is to cancel and set
aside a family settlement agreement due to alleged fraud and undue
influence. It is an action in personam, transitory in nature.”).
54. See, e.g., Lawton v. Higgins, No. PP: 05-2341, 2008 WL 2598135 (R.I.
Super. Ct. June 13, 2008) (undue influence renders will invalid); Paiva v.
Paiva, Nos. PC 05-3039, PC 05-5007, PP 06-0311, 2008 WL 2227775 (R.I.
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made from a donor to his or her spiritual advisor, “all gifts or
benefactions from the subject of such an influence to the possessor
of it, have been frequently avoided on grounds of public policy, and
without any suspicion that fraud or imposition of any kind ha[s]
been practiced.”55 To the extent that claims of undue influence
seek to invalidate a will being probated by a probate court, the
superior court’s exercise of jurisdiction may be improper.
B. The Superior Court’s Statutory Exercise of Jurisdiction
1.

Construction of Wills and Declaratory Judgments

In Rhode Island, like the majority of states, probate courts do
not have general jurisdiction to construe wills. Indeed, they may
only construe wills “when construction is necessarily involved in
establishing the will or in some step of the administration
proceeding.”56 Rhode Island probate courts’ power to construe
wills derives from statute. Rhode Island General Laws section 3313-8 provides:
Whenever any question arises as to the identity of a
legatee, or the construction or the payment and
satisfaction of any legacy, the probate court, upon petition
setting out such questions, after notice by citation to all
known parties and any additional notice the court may
direct, and after hearing thereon, may determine the
same and enter its order accordingly.57
This section was originally enacted with the Court and Practice
Act of July 17, 1905.58 Prior to that, “probate courts had no
jurisdiction to pass upon questions relating to the identity of a
legatee, or the construction or the payment or satisfaction of any
legacy.”59

Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2008) (same).
55. Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51, 57 (R.I. 1949) (quoting Corrigan v.
Pironi, 23 A. 355, 355 (N.J. 1891)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. RIEDEL, supra note 17, § 182. See also Carr v. Railton, 18 A.2d 646,
650 (R.I. 1941) (“Probate Courts [are empowered] to construe wills so far as
may be necessary to advise executors and administrators with the will
annexed with respect to the payment of legacies.”).
57. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-13-8 (2011).
58. Court and Practice Act of 1905, § 980.
59. Thompson v. Clarke, 127 A. 569, 570 (R.I. 1925).
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The Rhode Island General Assembly simultaneously enacted
Rhode Island General Laws section 8-9-12, providing that
“[p]robate courts may determine all questions as to the payments
of legacies by executors and administrators with the will annexed
and may allow such payments in the accounts of executors and
administrators.”60 In practice, a beneficiary, legatee, or heir at
law will file a petition for instructions in the probate court,
requesting that the court construe a legacy in a will.
However, Rhode Island has also adopted the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act, Rhode Island General Laws sections 930-1 et seq., giving the superior court jurisdiction “power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations between parties.”61
Rhode Island Gen. Laws section 9-30-2 provides:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract
or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute,
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have
determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance,
contract, or franchise an obtain a declaration of rights,
status or other legal relations thereunder.62
Given the probate court’s limited jurisdiction to interpret wills,
“the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is generally the proper
vehicle for what is normally referred to as a will construction
suit.”63
Reading sections 33-13-8, 8-9-12, and 9-30-1 in tandem might
give one pause. It is not immediately obvious where one ends and
the next begins.64 And any overlap between them would obviously
complicate the determination of proper jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, interpreting the statutes, found
no inconsistency among them.65 It explained that the probate
60. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-9-12 (2012).
61. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-30-1 (2012).
62. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-30-2 (2012).
63. RIEDEL, supra note 17, § 182 (citing Redmond v. R.I. Hosp. Trust
Nat’l Bank, 386 A.2d 1090 (R.I. 1978); Gray v. Leeman, 182 A.2d 119 (R.I.
1962)).
64. See id. (stating, “there is obviously some overlap” between §§ 33-13-8
and 9-30-1).
65. See Carr v. Railton, 18 A.2d 646, 651 (R.I. 1941).
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court’s power to determine payment of legacies is “strictly
limited . . . [and] exercisable only as to a legacy in a will then
before the court in the course of the administration of the estate of
the testator, and the question or questions to be determined must
have arisen in the course of such administration.”66 As such, the
jurisdiction granted to probate courts “differs radically from the
general jurisdiction” of the superior court,67 which one interested
in a will “may invoke at any time by filing, in the superior court, a
bill in equity for the construction of such will.”68
Another facet of will construction concerns testamentary
trusts, or trusts that are created by will. Rhode Island probate
courts do not have the ability to consider trust questions, or to
interpret a trust under a will.69 On the other hand, the superior
court has the power, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act, to declare parties’ rights under a trust, ascertain any class of
beneficiaries, direct the trustees to do or to abstain from doing a
particular act in their fiduciary capacity, or to determine any
question arising in the administration of the trust including
construction of the same.70
As may be evident from the language of the Declaratory
Judgments Act, the Rhode Island Superior Court may also
entertain claims impacting a probate estate outside the context of
a simple will construction. For example, in Tyre v. Swain, the
decedent died while scuba diving off the coast of Tortola in the
British Virgin Islands.71 Her husband, Swain, returned to the
United States, claiming that he did not know how his wife died
66. Id. at 650–51.
67. RIEDEL, supra note 17, § 182 (“At the time Carr was decided, the
Supreme Court, rather than the Superior Court had jurisdiction over will
construction suits. The current statute gives original jurisdiction to the
Superior Court.”).
68. Carr, 18 A.2d at 651.
69. See RIEDEL, supra note 17, § 542 (“As the only trial court in Rhode
Island of general jurisdiction having equity powers, the Superior Court has
the sole initial jurisdiction over the construction of trust instruments, the
appointment of trustees, the filling of vacancies in the office of trustee, the
settlement of debts due and claims by a trust, borrowing money and pledging
assets by a trustee, the execution of leases, and similar questions pertaining
to trusts.”).
70. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-30-1 to -16
(2012).
71. 946 A.2d 1189, 1192 (R.I. 2008).
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and that he was not diving with her when she drowned.72 The
decedent’s parents filed suit in superior court against Swain
during the pendency of probate proceedings, alleging that he was
a slayer under Rhode Island General Laws section 33-1.1-3, he
caused the decedent’s wrongful death under Rhode Island General
Laws section 10-7-1, and violated Rhode Island General Laws
section 9-1-2, imposing civil liability for a criminal act.73 If the
defendant was indeed found to be a slayer, it would preclude him
from taking under the decedent’s estate.74 As such, the court’s
decision would have a direct effect on the probate court
proceedings.75
Swain argued that the superior court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, claiming that the probate court had exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether a person is a slayer.76 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court disagreed.77 Rhode Island law vests
probate courts with jurisdiction over the probate of wills.78
However, the superior court, not the probate court, had
jurisdiction “to make declarations with respect to probate
matters,” including whether the defendant was a slayer; it was
then up to the probate court to determine what effect that
declaration had on the distribution of the decedent’s assets.79
One might interpret Swain to mean that the superior court
can usurp the powers of the probate court to oversee the
administration of an estate and distributions to the named
beneficiaries thereunder.
In reality, however, Swain is an
illustration of how the superior and probate courts can collaborate
to ensure a judicious outcome. That case necessitated a lengthy
civil trial, during which a jury was asked to determine whether
the defendant was a slayer, taking into account all of the evidence
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1197. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-3 (2011) defines a slayer as “any
person who willfully and unlawfully takes or procures to be taken the life of
another.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-3 provides that a slayer “shall be deemed
to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed
from the estate of the decedent to the slayer under the statutes of descent
and distribution, or by statutory right as surviving spouse.”
75. See Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1197.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1198.
78. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-9-9 (2012).
79. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1197–98.
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adduced. Such a trial would have arguably been inexpedient in
the probate court, given the probate court’s limited judicial
resources.80
The superior court’s declaration then provided
guidance to the probate court in its oversight and management of
the decedent’s estate.
2.

Civil Liability for Crimes Against a Person’s Estate

Another statute that provides a direct path to the superior
court, notwithstanding the pendency of estate administration, is
Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-2, actions seeking
damages for crimes committed against a decedent’s estate.81
Recall that in Swain the decedent’s parents brought a claim
against Swain in superior court for violation of Rhode Island
General Laws section 9-1-2.82 Section 9-1-2 states:
Whenever any person shall suffer any injury to his or her
person, reputation, or estate by reason of the commission
of any crime or offense, he or she may recover his or her
damages for the injury in a civil action against the
offender, and it shall not be any defense to such action
that no criminal complaint for the crime or offense has
been made; and whenever any person shall be guilty of
larceny, he or she shall be liable to the owner of the
money or articles taken for twice the value thereof, unless
the money or articles are restored, and for the value
thereof in case of restoration.83
It is clear that the General Assembly has given persons an avenue
of recovery in superior court against the perpetrator of a crime
against one’s estate. This action could be classified as both
statutory and in personam. The analysis remains the same: the
superior court may award money damages against in personam
defendants, but may not use assets of the decedent’s estate—
currently under the jurisdiction of the probate court—to make
plaintiffs whole.84
80. See id. at 1198.
81. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-2 (2012).
82. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1192.
83. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-2.
84. See Three Keys Ltd. v. SR Util. Holding Co., 540 F.3d 220, 230 (3d
Cir. 2008).
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C. The Exercise of Equity Jurisdiction
As we have seen, Rhode Island probate courts may exercise
jurisdiction only to the extent conferred by statute.85 What do the
General Laws say about equity jurisdiction? Consider Rhode
Island General Laws section 8-9-9. It states, in pertinent part:
Every probate court shall have the power to follow the
course of equity insofar as necessary to fulfill the
mandates of title 33 of the General Laws, specifically: the
replacement, removal, or filling of any vacancy of any
trustee under a trust established under a will; or tax
minimization or estate planning under § 33-15-37.1.86
Thus, the General Assembly has carved out very narrow
circumstances under which Rhode Island probate courts may
entertain claims of an equitable nature.
On the other hand, Rhode Island General Laws section 8-2-13
provides that the superior court has:
[E]xclusive original jurisdiction of suits and proceedings
of an equitable character and of statutory proceedings
following the course of equity; provided, however, that
every probate court shall have the power, concurrent with
the superior court, to replace, remove, or fill any vacancy
of any trustee under a trust established under a will, or to
effect tax minimization or estate planning under § 33-1537.1.87
And the concurrent jurisdiction statute, Rhode Island General
Laws section 8-2-17, provides that the superior court enjoys
general probate jurisdiction “when such jurisdiction is properly
involved in suits in equity.”88
The superior court’s exercise of equity jurisdiction over
probate matters may manifest itself either in the form of equitable
remedies imposed to assist with probate court proceedings or
85. See Burt v. R.I. Hosp. Trust, No. C.A. PC/02-2243, 2006 WL 2089254,
at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 2006) (“[P]robate courts in Rhode Island are
courts of limited jurisdiction and can ‘exercis[e] jurisdiction only in a manner
and to the extent conferred by statute’” (alteration in original) (quoting Carr
v. Prader, 715 A.2d 291, 293 (R.I. 1999))).
86. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-9-9 (2012).
87. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-13 (2012).
88. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-17 (2012).
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adjudication of equitable claims independent of probate court
proceedings.89 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
cautioned that equitable jurisdiction will “not be exercised where
it has already attached in proceedings in the probate court.”90
How do courts make this distinction?
In McSoley v. McSoley, a will was denied probate, from which
the appellants appealed.91 During the time that the appeal was
making its way through the Rhode Island Superior and Supreme
Courts, the appointed administratrix was expending funds of the
estate in defending against the will that the appellants sought to
probate.92 The appellants moved to enjoin the administratrix
from expending these funds.93 The court found that whether the
administratrix was properly vested with authority was a question
of law properly decided by the probate court.94 However, given
the possibility of irreparable loss for the appellants, the court
found there was a reason for intervention of equity to hold matters
in status quo until the authority of the administratrix was
determined at law on appeal of the probate court’s order.95 In
other words, the court isolated the portion of the case at law from
that which required the intervention of equity.96 The takeaway is
that Rhode Island courts will perform a probate exception-esque
test, even with the exercise of its inherent equitable powers, in
order to avoid improper invasion into affairs belonging to the
probate courts.
The superior court may also exercise equitable jurisdiction
over claims of an equitable nature filed in the first instance in
superior court.97 Once equity recognizes a case, it will afford
complete relief, including remedies at law, to the parties before
89. See McSoley v. McSoley, 84 A.2d 798, 800 (R.I. 1951).
90. Id. See also Probate Court of City of Providence v. Higgins, 191 A.
260, 262 (R.I. 1937) (finding that, in actions of debt on bond of surety for
guardian, superior court had jurisdiction in law to determine evidence and
settle account by chancerizing bond under equitable principles, even though
guardian had not filed final account, since court was not exercising general
probate jurisdiction).
91. 84 A.2d at 799.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 800.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Scoppio v. Cannella, 120 A. 867, 868 (R.I. 1923).
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it.98 Indeed, “[c]ourts of equity have broad power and will not act
so as to do an injustice or permit unconscionable acts within its
jurisdiction.”99 What constitutes an equitable cause of action?
Perhaps most famously, fraud. Indeed, fraud is “one of the
principal grounds of equitable jurisdiction.”100
On the other hand, Rhode Island probate courts are incapable
of adjudicating claims alleging fraud, as they are not general
courts of equity and can only follow the course of equity insofar as
it is allowed by statute.101 Indeed, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has held, as early as the nineteenth century, that “the court
of probate, which has no equity jurisdiction, is not adapted to the
investigation and determination of questions of fraud.”102 In
Champlin v. Slocum, a successor guardian, on behalf of his ward,
brought an action against the ward’s former guardian to recover
money for services rendered by the ward to the former guardian
while he was employed by the former guardian as a farm hand.103
The former guardian proffered a release signed by the ward as a
98. See id.
99. Van Slyke v. Bullock, No. 96-2223, 1996 WL 937009, at *5 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 1996).
100. Bosworth v. Bosworth, 167 A. 151, 152 (R.I. 1933). Accord Gee v.
Bullock, No. C.A. NO. 96-2223, 1996 WL 937009, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov.
16, 1996) (citations omitted) (“Allegations of misrepresentation are one of the
principal grounds for obtaining equitable jurisdiction in Superior Court.”
(citing Bosworth, 167 A. 151)). Undue influence is a species of fraud and,
thus, falls within the same category. See Paiva v. Paiva, Nos. PC 05-3039,
PC 05-5007, PP 06-0311, 2008 WL 2227775, at *22–23 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr.
10, 2008) (holding that undue influence is a constructive fraud). Indeed,
“[u]ndue influence long has been recognized in equity as a defense to or a
means of challenging the validity of a will, deed, or contract. In such cases,
equity provides an action for restitution or rescission to cure the dominant
party’s wrongful ‘substitution of [his or her will] for the free will and choice
[of the subservient party].’” Lavoie v. N.E. Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228–
29 (R.I. 2007) (citations omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Filippi v.
Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 630 (R.I. 2003)).
101. See Champlin v. Slocum, 103 A. 706, 707 (R.I. 1918) (involving a
release between a guardian and ward that allegedly was procured by fraud);
Fletcher v. Estate of Skelly, No. C.A. NO. 97-0139, 1997 WL 839922, at *3
(R.I. Super. Ct. May 28, 1997) (“The Probate Court is not a court of equity.”).
102. Champlin, 103 A. at 708 (citing O’Connor v. O’Connor, 37 A. 634
(R.I. 1897)). See also Burt v. R.I. Hosp. Trust, No. C.A. PC/02-2243, 2006 WL
2089254, at *7 n.9 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 2006) (finding that claims of
breaches of fiduciary duty, like fraud, are not appropriate for resolution by
the probate court).
103. 103 A. at 706–07.
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defense to the action, which the successor guardian alleged was
procured by fraud.104 The case was tried before a jury, after
which the superior court directed a verdict for the former
guardian, holding that the suit was “one which involved relations
of guardian and ward” and must “be adjudicated in the probate
court . . . and that the [s]uperior [c]ourt had no jurisdiction.”105
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court disagreed for a
two reasons.106
First, the probate court undoubtedly had
jurisdiction over the settlement of accounts of guardians and the
power to direct and supervise the management of the estate.107
Ordinarily, the ward must wait until the accounts are settled
before bringing an action against his guardian.108 However, this
general rule “does not include all matters of litigation which may
arise between the guardian and the ward but is confined” to
questions concerning “property rights pertaining to the
guardianship.”109 The court found that the value of services
provided by the ward to his former guardian was not the kind of
property that the guardian was bound to inventory and account to
the probate court.110 Secondly, the court found that “the court of
probate, which has no equity jurisdiction, is not adapted to the
investigation and determination of question of fraud. The rule is
well settled that the jurisdiction of law and equity on the question
of fraud of this character is concurrent.”111
D. Supplemental Jurisdiction
What if a plaintiff brought a variety of claims, some of which
fall within the jurisdiction of the superior court and others of
which do not? Rhode Island General Laws section 8-2-14 provides:
If an action is brought in the superior court which is
within the jurisdiction conferred by this section, the
superior court shall have jurisdiction over all other
actions arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id.
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provided the other actions are joined with the action
within the jurisdiction conferred by this section or are
subsequently made a part thererof under applicable
procedural rules.112
The Equity Jurisdiction statute provides:
If an action is brought in the superior court which
represents an attempt in good faith to invoke the
jurisdiction conferred by this section, the superior court
shall have jurisdiction of all other actions arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence, provided the other
actions are joined with the action so brought or are
subsequently made a part thereof under applicable
procedural rules, and the court may retain jurisdiction
over the other actions even though the initial action fails
for want of equity jurisdiction.113
Although the statute does not make explicit reference to
“supplemental jurisdiction,” it authorizes a court to extend
jurisdiction over claims not falling within the original equity
jurisdiction of the court. “Thus, § 8-2-13 is analogous to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, which authorizes federal district courts, in certain
situations, to extend supplemental jurisdiction over claims not
otherwise cognizable in federal court.”114
For example, in Donato v. BankBoston, the plaintiff filed suit
in the Rhode Island Superior Court against the co-executors/cotrustees of decedent’s estate and trust, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of trust, and legal malpractice.115 Several years
later, the plaintiff amended his complaint to add new claims, one
of which alleged a violation of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.116
The
defendants then removed the case to the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island.117 At the close of the
plaintiff’s evidence, the court considered its jurisdiction over the
claims and found that the claims against the co-executors “were in
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-14 (2012).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-13 (2012).
Chavers v. Fleet Bank (RI), N.A., 844 A.2d 666, 678 n.11 (R.I. 2004).
110 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D.R.I. 2000).
Id.
Id.

RMURPHYFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/19/2015 12:26 PM

2015] MURDER, FRAUD & TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE

425

essence claims regarding the handling of a will and/or an estate,
and as such were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Probate Court” and that those claims could not originally have
been brought in Rhode Island Superior Court.118 However, the
court found that the breach of trust claims were properly brought
in superior court and, citing to section 8-2-13, found that the
claims against the co-executors which arose out of the same
transaction and occurrence were properly brought in superior
court.119 Furthermore, although the plaintiff brought claims
entirely distinct from the breach of trust claims, the court opted to
exercise its discretion in the interest of judicial economy to retain
jurisdiction.120
IV. THE ANALYSIS OF JURISDICTION IN PRACTICE: MOM’S CLAIM

What does all of this mean in practice? Attorneys should first
attempt to identify the nature of the client’s claim when
undertaking a jurisdictional analysis. Does the client have a
cause of action which is ordinarily recognized in superior court,
such as breach of fiduciary duty or tortious interference with an
inheritance? Is the claim directed at an individual, such that it is
in personam? If not, does the cause of action interfere with a
purely probate proceeding? Is the remedy sought or claim itself
one that sounds in equity, such as fraud? If the client has
multiple claims, are they so interrelated that the superior court
can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the ones more
properly asserted in probate court? These inquiries are critical to
the question of whether an action can be brought directly in
superior court.
Remember Mom in our hypothetical above. Must she await a
determination by the probate court that the alleged “will” is
invalid or fraudulent? Can the probate court even issue such a
determination? Let’s evaluate her potential claims using the
analysis above.
 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines tortious
interference with an inheritance as: “[o]ne who by
fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 45 (citing Dugdale v. Chase, 157 A. 430, 430–31 (R.I. 1931)).
Id. at 46.
Id.
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prevents another from receiving from a third person
an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have
received is subject to liability to the other for loss of
the inheritance or gift.”121 The United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island in Henry
predicted that, in the absence of an adequate statutory
remedy, one may pursue this claim in Rhode Island.122
As we have seen, a claim for tortious interference with
an inheritance is not subject to the probate
exception.123 Furthermore, as Mom’s claim of tortious
interference would seek an in personam judgment,
rather than one implicating the rem of her son’s
estate, the superior court has proper jurisdiction.


What if Mom suspects that her son’s fiancée has
murdered her son? She may, like the plaintiffs in Tyre
v. Swain, bring an action directly in superior court
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, seeking
a declaration that the fiancée is a slayer.124 Rhode
Island General Laws section 33-1.1-1(3) defines a
slayer as, “any person who willfully and unlawfully
takes or procures to be taken the life of another.”125 If
the fiancée is declared a slayer, she will be prohibited
from taking under the alleged will.126 The superior
court’s decision will then assist the probate court to
determine distribution of the son’s will.



The superior court may also, under the Uniform

121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979).
122. 856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 350 (D.R.I. 2012) (citing Umsted v. Umsted, 446
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2006)). In practice, a plaintiff must first exhaust her
probate court remedies before pursuing a claim for tortious interference. See
Umsted, 446 F.3d at 21. While this may take the shape of a will challenge in
probate court, it may also consist of bringing an action in the name of the
estate, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws section 33-18-17, to recover property that
belongs to the estate, if the executor or administrator fails to do so. See id.
123. See id. at 351 (citing Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311–12
(2006)).
124. 946 A.2d 1189, 1198 (R.I. 2008). A plaintiff may bring a suit to
declare a person a slayer even in the absence of a criminal conviction. See id.
125. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-1(3) (2011).
126. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2 (2011).
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Declaratory Judgment Act, construe the will in its
entirety and determine its validity. Recall that a
probate court’s ability to construe a will is limited to
determinations of specific legacies in a will, and the
question must have arisen during the course of the
will’s administration.127


Mom may also bring a claim under Rhode Island
General Laws § 9-1-2, civil liability for crimes against
one’s estate.128 This is a statutory cause of action that
gives claimants direct access to superior court, as in
the Swain case.129 It also seeks an in personam
judgment.



Does Mom have a claim of fraud against the fiancée?
“In Rhode Island, common law fraud has four
elements: (1) a false or misleading statement of
material fact that was (2) known by the defendant to
be false and (3) made with intent to deceive, (4) upon
which the plaintiff relies to its detriment.”130 Putting
aside the question of whether Mom can satisfy these
elements, claims of fraud sound in equity and may be
brought in the first instance in superior court.131
V.

CONCLUSION

When confronted with a jurisdictional challenge, courts are
cautious not to overstep their authority or usurp proceedings more
properly belonging to another court. The same holds true in the
context of claims that may affect, however remotely or
tangentially, probate court proceedings.132
Nevertheless,
attorneys must not assume that, simply because a will is being

127. See Henry, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
128. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-2 (2012).
129. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1191 .
130. Van Slyke v. Bullock, No. 96-2223, 1996 WL 937009, at *5 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 1996).
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Estate of Donatelli v. Berkshire Place, Ltd., No. PC-20113423, 2014 WL 185329, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2014); see also Dugdale
v. Chase, 157 A. 430, 431 (R.I. 1931).

RMURPHYFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/19/2015 12:26 PM

428 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:404
probated or an estate administered, those involved in the
proceeding are immune from claims asserted in superior court.
Rather, one must look to the nature of the claim to determine the
appropriate forum.

